FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CONFLICTING MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES: THE CASE OF MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS

Research Library

By Fischer P, Louis H
Working Papers

Date Released: 19/07/2010
PDF Document

We analyze the effect of external financing concerns on managers’ financial reporting behavior prior to management buyouts (MBOs). Prior studies hypothesize that managers intending to undertake an MBO have an incentive to manage earnings downward to reduce the purchase price.

You need to login to download this paper.

Rate this Paper:

You need to login to add your own rating

Comments

template name 01 January 0001, 00:00 Report Abuse

template

Submit A Paper

If you have a paper that you like posted on our website then please complete the following details. We will contact you to inform you of our decision to include it on our site as soon as possible.

First Name*
Surname*
Occupation*
Email address*

Please supply a short summary of your paper

London Business School Coller Institute of Private Equity

Research Library

FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CONFLICTING MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES: THE CASE OF MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS

Rate this Paper:

Comments

Featured Papers

COLLER PRIZE PRESENTATION - YOUR FORMER EMPLOYEES MATTER: PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AND THEIR FINANCIAL ADVISORS

PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE IN PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS

Submit A Paper